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Abstract  
The aim of this article is to analyse the nature of the relationship between public debt and economic 
growth in the WAEMU. A standard growth model was specified and then estimated in quadratic form 
from the GMM (GMM). The results show a non-linear relationship between public debt and economic 
growth. Thus, public debt stimulates economic growth when it does not exceed the threshold of 15% of 
GDP. Robustness tests show that public debt is boosting the economic conditions of countries with sound 
macroeconomic policies and good institutional quality.  
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1. Introduction 
The countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) (Note 1), since their 
independence, have embarked on an unprecedented debt process. This debt had strong repercussions on 
economic activity on the one hand with a slowdown in growth, and on monetary policy on the other hand 
with an increase in the rate of inflation. From the 1980s to the 1990s, we thus noted an aggravation of 
fiscal deficits and external balances, timid growth as well as a deterioration in the terms of trade due 
mainly to the fall in the prices of raw materials on which countries of the Union are very dependent. The 
rapid growth of public debt has drawn the attention of policy makers and economists regarding the 
paramount effects of such a large public debt on economic development.  
In developed economies, public debt levels have reached unprecedented rates and this in the absence of a 
major war before the global health crisis of 2020. It is therefore important to know to what extent public 
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debt affects the economic growth of the Union. The Maastricht Treaty establishes a debt target of 60% of 
GDP; the public debt must therefore not exceed it. 
However, and following the financial crisis of 2007-2008 the countries of the euro zone recorded an 
economic slowdown that caused serious repercussions on public finances. According to the World Bank 
World Development Indicators (2019), the debt ratio went from 66.2% in 2007 to 87.7% in 2011. This 
more or less significant increase differs from country to country. In Ireland we saw the largest increase in 
the level of its debt by 90% of GDP. As for Greece, the increase in debt exceeded 50% of GDP. Likewise, 
Spain and Portugal are experiencing an increase in their debt ratios of more than 30% of GDP. In most 
euro zone countries, public debt exceeds the limit imposed by the Maastricht Treaty. The sharp rise in 
public debt is not just exclusive for the euro area countries. This increase was recorded in other regions 
and over the same period. In the United Kingdom, the relatively low public debt ratios in 2007 thus 
increased from more than 40% of GDP to almost 85% of GDP at the end of 2011. In addition, in the 
United States the public debt ratio increased from more than 60% of GDP to around 100% of GDP at the 
end of 2011. Still in Japan, the debt ratio that was already high in 2007, 50% of GDP soared to 240% of 
GDP in 2015.  
It is obvious that this sharp increase in the debt ratio observed in recent times is directly linked, on the one 
hand, to the support programs granted at the time of the crisis and, on the other hand, to the drop in 
revenues caused by the economic recession following the crisis. It should therefore be noted that the 
growth of budget deficits effectively forms the major determinant of the increase in the public debt ratio. 
Indeed, this development has led economists and political decision-makers to scrutinize the effects of 
public debt on economic growth. In this context, an abundant literature has dealt with the economic 
impacts of public debt. Thus, Barro (1974), Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) and many others, have 
provided good literature reviews by developing theoretical support for studying the relationship between 
public debt and economic growth. Later, Singh (2006) and Cohen (2011) presented a broad and relatively 
exhaustive review of the nature of the relationship between public debt and economic growth. 
Furthermore, most empirical work on the subject try to find out an optimal threshold for the public debt 
to GDP ratio, in the absence of a clear theoretical model showing the interactions between public debt 
levels and the dynamics of growth (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010; Ferreira, 2009; Kumar & Woo, 2010; 
Checherita & Rother, 2010; Panizza & Presbitero, 2012, etc.). Only, should it be emphasized that despite 
the criticisms addressed to the Reinhart and Rogoff case and the error revealed in their work, the 
alarming threshold of 90% seems very important because it fills a gap in the literature on the subject. It 
should be noted that this work mainly concerns panels from developed and emerging countries from 
Europe, Asia or America. 
Concerning the WAEMU developing countries, the convergence of budgetary policies has proved 
necessary and the establishment of a multilateral surveillance process has made it possible to highlight a 
certain number of budgetary criteria, of which we can mainly note: the ratio of outstanding domestic and 
external debt to nominal GDP should not exceed 70%. The main objective of this article is to assess the 
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effects of the expansion of public debt and good governance on the performance of the WAEMU 
economy. Specifically, it is first, about researching the nature of the relationship between public debt and 
economic growth and deciding on the existence of a possible threshold beyond which such a relationship 
will change shape. Secondly, it is an analysis of the effect of good governance on the economy of the 
Union.  
 
2. Some Elements of Literature 
Economic literature has learned, in the case of large external debt servicing, about the channels through 
which increasing public debt could hinder long-term growth prospects in developing countries. 
Theoretically, a country is said to be over-indebted when the servicing of its external debt is so heavy that 
a large part of current production will be granted to foreign lenders. According to Krugman (1988), the 
over-indebtedness hypothesis suggests that if there is a future probability that the external public debt 
will be greater than the country’s repayment capacity, the expected costs of servicing the debt further 
discourage domestic and foreign investment and hamper economic growth. In this context, the debt 
repayment capacity of the country concerned is weakened by a high level of debt; therefore, the future 
costs of debt service discourage national investment. This principle is known as the virtual debt burden or 
“debt overhang”. This theory is perceptible through the Laffer curve according to which the increase in 
debt lowers the probability of its repayment.  
Singh (2006) admits that a high level of public debt has a negative impact on growth and other indicators 
of economic development, and therefore on macroeconomic stability. Moreover, the work of Cerra et al. 
(2008) has revealed the existence of a relationship between increased debt and capital flight. Thus, 
countries with weak institutions tend to accumulate debt and therefore, discourage capital inflows while 
promoting capital flight. In the eighties, economists highlighted the harmful role that debt exerts on the 
expectations of economic agents, and subsequently on investment: this is indeed the theory of the virtual 
burden of debt. According to this theory, when a country can no longer meet its debt service, there would 
be less motivation to invest, taking into account the expected costs of this service. This has a depressive 
effect on investment by directly affecting capital movements. Hanson (2007) has shown that for 
countries with a large share of domestic debt, private investment is limited which causes a decrease in net 
national savings and an increase in interest rates, and therefore, we are witnessing a moderation in credit. 
The credit rationing is due to the transfer of risks to the banks in the event of a long maturity given the 
fixed rate of internal borrowing and therefore a reduction in yields. 
In sum, these studies have shown the negative impact of a high level of public debt on economic growth 
without questioning the nature of such a relationship. Indeed, public debt has a positive impact on growth 
up to a certain level; beyond this threshold, the effect of the debt becomes negative. In addition, excess 
public debt can affect economic growth through several transmission channels. 
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2.1 Nature of the Relationship between Public Debt and Economic Growth 
In the economic literature, several empirical studies have focused on the nature of the relationship 
between public debt and economic growth. On this subject, Aschauer (2000) proposed a growth model 
showing the nonlinear effect of public capital on economic growth. For him, public debt is a means of 
financing public capital. He thus shows that an increase in public debt can have positive effects, but by 
exceeding a certain threshold these effects become negative. Along the same lines, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010a), analysed the relationship between total public debt and economic growth based on a data set 
comprising more than 3,700 observations from a sample of 44 countries, including 20 industrialized and 
24 developing ones. These analyses show that public debt is not linked to economic growth as long as its 
threshold does not exceed 90% of GDP. In fact, beyond a rate of 90%, the growth rate of highly indebted 
countries is significantly lower than that of countries whose public debt/GDP ratio is less than 90%. This 
non-linear effect is present in both advanced and emerging economies. The hypothesis of non-linearity is 
essentially based on the idea that the effect of debt on economic growth is not always negative. Indeed, 
moderate debt can have a positive effect, but beyond a certain level, it becomes harmful to investment 
and therefore, to economic growth. According to these authors, the non-linear relationship can be 
explained by the notion of debt intolerance. When the economy reaches the expected debt tolerance 
limits, there is an increase in market interest rates. This rate hike leads to a rise in taxes, which then leads 
to severe budgetary adjustments. In order to better present this relationship, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b), 
using a sample of 20 developed countries over the 1790-2009 period, show that advanced countries with 
public debt greater than 90% of GDP have average growth two percentage points lower than that of 
countries with debt less than 30% of GDP. Thus, the growth rate of countries exceeding the 90% 
threshold is 1.7 %, while that of countries with a public debt to GDP ratio of less than 30% is 3.7%. The 
difference is two percentage points, which argues in favour of a public debt—stronger growth 
relationship in emerging economies. Caner et al. (2010) obtained these results. The latter estimated, in 
the case of developed countries, an optimal threshold of public debt of 77% of GDP. Beyond this 
threshold, an additional percentage point of the debt ratio costs 1.7% of annual real growth. For 
developing countries, the threshold is 64% of GDP. By exceeding this limit, the growth rate drops by 
around 2% of GDP. Indeed, the nonlinearity of the link between debt and economic growth shows that a 
moderate level of debt, the increase of public debt to GDP ratio favours the development of investments 
in order to catch more rapid growth, but it should be mentioned that an increase in debt above the 
thresholds already reached, reduces economic growth.  
On a sample of OECD countries, Panizza and Presbitero (2012) effectively support the existence of a 
correlation between debt and growth. For them, the link between these two variables is explained simply 
by the fact that weak economic growth leads to high levels of public debt. Indeed, a high level of public 
debt affects economic growth via a specific channel. A government with a high level of debt opts for a 
restrictive policy in order to consolidate its finances, yet such measures will overwhelm economic 
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activity. In addition, the implementation of severe measures during a recession increases its depressive 
effects and ultimately increases the burden of public debt. 
In sum, several empirical studies have made it possible to identify the “optimal” level of public debt in 
order to avoid the negative effects on economic growth. The results confirm the existence of a negative 
and non-linear causal relationship between public debt and growth. Indeed, a low level of public debt has 
no impact on economic growth, while from a certain level, public debt negatively affects growth. 
Previous studies have determined a critical debt threshold between 90% and 100% of GDP. However, in 
certain cases, several observed facts invalidate this threshold. This is the case of Japan where the debt 
exceeds 200% of the GDP. Therefore, there is no well-defined magic threshold from which growth 
declines appreciably. It is therefore, essential when analysing the critical debt threshold to take into 
account the economic, budgetary and institutional characteristics of each country apart.  
2.2 Public Debt and Economic Growth 
In the empirical literature, while some have been interested in the existence of a critical debt threshold, 
others have shown that a certain level of institutional quality is necessary in order to encourage 
investment, stimulate growth and therefore benefit from the debt relief policy.  
Indeed, Cordella et al. (2010) show that for developing countries the link between public debt and 
economic growth depends not only on the scale of debt but on the quality of policies and institutions as 
well. The authors have proven the existence of over-indebtedness in countries with good institutional 
quality, and this when the net present value of the debt rises above 20 to 25% of the GDP, but beyond a 
rate of 70 to 80% of GDP debt has no effect. In countries with poor institutional quality, the rates are 
lower than in other countries but without overlooking the importance of the debt burden. In an article on 
the relationship between debt relief and institutional quality, Asiedu (2003) shows that poor, heavily 
indebted countries have weak institutions and must reach a certain level of quality institutions to take 
advantage of debt relief. In addition, Dessy and Vencatachellum (2007), shows that the relief granted to 
14 African countries between 1989 and 2003 positively affected the share of resources of countries that 
have reformed their institutions. 
All in all, previous studies suggest that public debt affects the economic conditions of countries with 
sound macroeconomic policies and good institutional quality.  
 
3. Methodological Approach  
3.1 Specification of the Empirical Model  
In this article, the selected empirical model follows the above-mentioned empirical literature. The basic 
model can take the following form:                                             𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                   (1)   
The transformation e the equation (1) can write equation (2) below:  
                𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = (𝛼 − 1)𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + β𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + γt + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                     (2) 
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In equation (2), 𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents the GDP growth rate for the country 𝑖 at time. 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 is the endogenous 
explanatory variable. It measures GDP growth for the country 𝑖 right now 𝑡 − 1. 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  is the public debt 
of the country 𝑖 at the moment 𝑡. X𝑖𝑡  is a vector of control variables, 𝜇𝑖𝑡 the country specific effect and 
γt the temporal effect? Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡the term error.  
The non-linear approach is based on the idea of introducing the square of the variable “public debt” into 
the group of exogenous variables and generally takes the following form:                                    yit = αyit−1 + 𝛽1DPit + 𝛽2𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡2 + δXit + γt +  µit + εit                                             (3) 
The basic hypothesis of our work is to verify the effect of a very high debt on economic activity. The 
conditional convergence hypothesis implies a negative and significant value of the coefficient of the 
delayed value of GDP per capita. In this case, the control variables and the individual specific effect 
increase the level of income per capita over the long term towards which each country converges. On the 
contrary, a positive value of this coefficient signifies the rejection of the convergence hypothesis, defined 
as a catch-up process. The sample consists of eight WAEMU countries for the period 2000-2019. 
3.2 Variables and Data Sources 
The endogenous variable being the annual growth of GDP per capita. The explanatory variables are 
presented in Appendix 2. As an indicator of the performance of economic activity, we use the annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita. This measurement being the most appropriate allowing the verification of 
the conditional convergence hypothesis. This variable was explicitly used in the empirical literature 
(Patillo et al., 2004; Schclarek, 2004; Ferreira, 2009; Checherita & Rother, 2010; Kumar & Woo, 2010; 
Presbitero, 2010; Baum et al., 2013). Regarding the explanatory variables of the model, the variable of 
interest, gross public debt, measures the degree of debt and helps to interpret the debt situation. Indeed, 
the ability to pay or the solvency of an economy is linked to its wealth; public debt can therefore, be 
considered as an indicator of the financial situation of countries. The prevailing view is that public debt 
can stimulate growth in the short term, but seems harmful to growth in the long term. In addition, 
economic theory suggests that debt can promote economic growth, but within limits to be determined. As 
a result, the link between these two variables is not clear and is still tainted with imprecision. The variable 
of interest has been used in almost all recent studies on the importance of the relationship between public 
debt and economic growth (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009-2010; Kumar & Woo, 2010; Panizza & Presbitero, 
2012). The model also contains a vector of control variables from the theoretical literature and usually 
introduced in this kind of estimation (Table 2).  
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Table 1. Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
Variables  Definition of variables  Scoring  
Growth rate of GDP per capita 
(%annual)  
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP 
per capita based on constant local 
currencies.  
gdp _cap_growth _rate 
Gross public debt (% GDP)  
Gross public debt as a percentage of 
GDP.  
Public _debt  
Population growth (% annual)  
Annual percentage growth rate of the 
population is defined as the average 
annual change in the size of a 
population during a given period.  
popgrowth  
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US $)  
GDP per capita represents gross 
domestic product divided by 
population.  
gdp_percapita  
Inflation, consumer prices  
(% annual)  
Inflation as measured by the growth in 
the consumer price index reflects 
changes in the cost of a basket of goods 
and services purchased by the average 
consumer.  
Inflation  
Gross capital formation (% of GDP)  Gross capital formation invest  
Trade openness (% GDP)  
This variable measures the degree of 
trade openness of countries to the 
outside (X + M) on GDP.  
openess  
Gross enrollment rate (% gross)  Gross enrollment ratio.  
Primary is the total number Enrollment 
in primary education, whatever their 
age, expressed as a percentage of the 
population of official primary 
education age. 
scola  
Total unemployment (% of population)  
The share of the labor force that is 
unemployed but available for and 
looking for work 
unempl_rate  
Source: construction of of authors. 
Regarding the data, they come from WDI of the World Bank (2019). 
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3.3 Estimation Method 
The estimation method adopted is the Generalized Moment Method (GMM). The generalized moments 
estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is based on the conditions of orthogonality between the 
delayed endogenous variable and the error term. It provides solutions to the problems of simultaneity 
bias, reverse causation and omitted variables. It also makes it possible to correct the indigeneity of all the 
explanatory variables of the model. The proposed estimator refers to the GMM method in first difference 
in order to eliminate specific individual effects and the use of delayed values of the dependent variable as 
instruments. Later, Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed the GMM estimator as a system. They combined 
the equations in prime differences with the equations in level in which the variables are instrumented by 
their prime differences. Through Monte Carlo simulations, Blundell and Bond (1998) proved that the 
GMM system estimator is more efficient than that in primary differences. Indeed, when the instruments 
are weak, the GMM estimator in first differences gives us biased results in finite samples. Thus, we use 
the two-step estimation procedure. The recourse to this procedure is explained by the fact that the 
estimator obtained is more effective and more efficient than that in one stage (Sevestre, 2002; Roodman, 
2009). Indeed, the estimation in two stages is more precise than that in one stage since it takes into 
consideration the structure of the matrix of the variance covariance of the errors. 
 
4. Results and Interpretations 
4.1 Unit Root Test Results in Panels 
Two stationarity tests on panel data are conducted. The Levin Lin and Chu LLC test (2002) and the Im 
Pesaran and Shin IPS test (2003). The Table 2 summarizes the results of these tests. These two tests are 
based on the null hypothesis of unit root. The table shows that the LLC test (2002) leads to the rejection 
of the null unit root hypothesis. Almost all of the variables are stationary in level. Taking into account the 
heterogeneity of the autoregressive root by means of the I PS test (2003) significantly modifies the results 
obtained by LLC (2002). Only the institutional variables are non-stationary when applying the IPS test 
(2003).  
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Table 2. Root Test Results  
Variables LLC IPS 
gdp _cap_growth_rate  -5.179 (0.0000) * 
-5.492 (0.0000) * 
-5.920 (0.0000) * 
-7.103 (0.0000) * 
Public _debt  -2.528 (0.0057) * 
-3.973 (0.0000) * 
-1.364 (0.0862) *** 
-0.339 (0.3670) 
gdp _percapita  -2.020 (0.0217) ** 
-2.425 (0.9923) 
-0.313 (1.0000) 
-4.374 (1.0000) 
Inflation  -3.598 (0.0002) * 
-4.525 (0.0000) * 
-2.071 (0.0191) ** 
-8.088 (0.0000) * 
invest  -3.437 (0.0003) * 
-3.067 (0.0011) * 
-1.477 (0.0698) *** 
-2.988 (0.0014) * 
unempl _rate  -1.988 (0.0234) ** 
-1.461 (0.0719) *** 
-0.938 (0.1739) 
-1.886 (0.0296) ** 
scola  -0.483 (0.3142) 
-2.107 (0.0175) ** 
1.145 (0.8741) 
1.157 (0.8766) 
popgrowth  -4.265 (0.0000) * 
-2.431 (0.0071) * 
-8.358 (0.0000) * 
-5.351 (0.0000) * 
openess  -7.555 (0.0000) * 
-5.054 (0.0000) * 
-4.808 (0.0000) * 
-3.587 (0.0002) * 
The unit root hypothesis is rejected at * 1%, ** 5%, *** 10%. LLC and IPS correspond respectively to 
the test results of Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003). 
Source: construction of authors. 
 
4.2 The Results of the Estimates by the Generalized Moments Method 
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results of the dynamic panel estimates of the chosen model using the 
Generalized Moments Method (GMM) in first differences of Arellano and Bond (1991). Table 3 
summarizes all the linear and non-linear (quadratic) regressions regarding the three institutional variables, 
the debt indicator and the control variables taken from the different specifications. Table 4 presents the 
different estimates after the introduction of new control variables. Finally, Table 5 summarizes the 
different thresholds determined.  
The estimation results of the first specification of our model are presented in the following Table 3:  
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Table 3. Results of the Estimations 
gdp _cap_growth_rate (-1) Linear specifications Non-linear specifications 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) ‘ (2) ‘ (3) ‘ (4) ‘ 
-0.444*  
(0.009)  
-0.380**  
(0.058)  
-0.478**  
(0.041) 
0.000  
(0.995)  
-0.342**
*  
(0.066)  
-0.560**  
(0.023)  
-0.301  
(0.232)  
-0.497**
*  
(0.078)  
lag _log_gdp_percapita  -0.317*  
(0.003)  
-0.267*  
(0.000) *  
-0.321*  
(0.000)  
-0.201*  
(0.000)  
-0.406 * 
(0.002)  
-0.320*  
(0.002)  
-0.353*  
(0.003) 
-0.273**  
(0.020)  
log _invest  0.036*  
(0.004) 
0.023*  
(0.008)  
0.027*  
(0.007)  
0.027**  
(0.036) 
0.034*  
(0.001) 
0.027**  
(0.035) 
0.026**  
(0.049) 
0.027***  
(0.054) 
loginflation  -0.000  
(0.977)  
0.001  
(0.605)  
0.003  
(0.235)  
-0.003  
(0.138)  
0.000  
(0.985)  
0.001  
(0.431)  
0.002  
(0.100)  
-0,000  
(0.852)  
log _openess  0.313  
(0.101)  
0.021  
(0.153)  
0.021  
(0.102)  
0.058*  
(0.000)  
0.044*  
(0.000)  
0.016  
(0.380)  
0.042*  
(0.002)  
0.042*  
(0.002)  
log _scola  0.094  
(0.291)  
-0.115  
(0.137)  
-0.086  
(0.492)  
0.009  
(0.930)  
0.116  
(0.191)  
-0.026  
(0.745)  
0.011  
(0.898)  
0.083  
(0.415)  
log _public_debt  -0.018***  
(0.075) 
-0.024*  
(0.003)  
-0.017*  
(0.002) 
-0.014**
*  
(0.087) 
0.096*  
(0.002) 
0.087**  
(0.028) 
0.143*  
(0,000)  
0.135*  
(0,000)  
log _pub_debt_carr          -0.018*  
(0.003)  
-0.018*  
(0.000)  
-0.026*  
(0,000)  
-0.025*  
(0,000)  
account    0.044***  
(0.059) 
      0.050***  
(0.054)  
    
regl _quality      0.035**  
(0.041)  
      0.013  
(0.200)  
  
corrupt        -0.028**  
(0.020)  
      -0.019  
(0.228)  
Number of observations  137  81  81  81  137  81  81  81  
Sargan test  4.834*  
(1)  
3.663*  
(1)  
3.171*  
(1)  
10.358*  
(1)  
2.303*  
(1)  
2.391*  
(1)  
5.29*  
(1)  
6.502*  
(1)  
AR (1) -0.556*  
(0.577)  
-0.033*  
(0.973)  
0.627*  
(0.53)  
-1.396*  
(0.162)  
-0.628*  
(0.529) 
0.569*  
(0.569)  
-0.698*  
(0.484)  
-0.078*  
(0.937)  
AR (2) 0.534*  
(0.593) 
0.469*  
(0.638)  
-0.069*  
(0.944)  
1.276*  
(0.100)  
0.765*  
(0.443)  
-0.127* 
(0.898)  
0.584*  
(0.558)  
-0.105*  
(0.916)  
*; ** and *** significant respectively at 1%, 5 and 10%.%. The figures in brackets are p-values.  
Source: construction of authors.  
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The results of the table show that the coefficients associated with the variable GDP by delayed head are 
all negative and significant. The conditional convergence hypothesis is therefore, accepted in all cases at 
the 1% threshold. This result therefore confirms the conditional convergence hypothesis implemented 
both in the work of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and of Mankiw et al. (1992). The negative coefficient 
per capita income is thus interpreted by catching up with the level of long-term income towards which 
each country converges. The investment rate (log_invest) on the other hand admits positive and 
significant coefficients. These results prove that investment is an engine of growth and thus corroborate 
the majority of empirical work highlighting the importance of this variable as a determinant of growth. 
Similarly, economic openness (log_openess) contributes positively to economic growth. This result 
could be explained by the fact that the more the economy is closed, the more it suffers more from the 
consequences of macroeconomic imbalances. The insignificance of this variable (log_openess) depends 
on the other variables introduced into the model. This brings together a fringe of the literature which 
claims that openness is only favourable to growth when the economy reaches a well-defined level of 
economic development allowing it to face competition on foreign markets (Verner, 2015).  
Regarding the inflation (log inflation), it is not statistically significant and not stable. The signs 
associated with this variable are changing: the results of the estimates show that the effect of inflation is 
generally marginal; it is negative and not significant in specifications (1), (4) and (4) ‘, while it is positive 
in other specifications. These results are not surprising despite the fact that they contradict certain 
theoretical works, which predict a negative and significant relationship between the rate of inflation and 
economic growth. 
With regard to schooling (log_scola), the results indicate that the coefficients related to this variable are 
of expected sign but not significant. This is not in line with the results of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) 
on the determinants of growth, which demonstrate the existence of a positive and statistically significant 
link between the level of education and economic growth. This result can be explained first, essentially, 
that the quality of education in the Union is too low to allow the school to better contribute to the growth 
of the economy. In addition, a persisting fragile interaction between educational results and economic 
growth could also be linked to the high levels of employment in the public sector and the reduced number 
of dynamic and internationally competitive economic sectors. These explanations are echoed in the work 
of the World Bank (2007). 
In the specifications (2) to (4) were introduced successively and respectively the following institutional 
variables: Be attentive and account (account), regulatory quality (regl_quality) and fight against 
corruption (corrup). These variables are taken into account in the regressions for both linear and 
non-linear specifications. The results specification (2) and (2)’, display, first, a positive and significant 
effect of the variable account on economic growth. Indeed, an environment that provides a certain degree 
of freedom of human as well as political rights is an environment, which, is beneficial for economic 
growth. Subsequently, we notice that the coefficient of the quality of regulation index is positive and 
significant at the 5% threshold in the linear specification (3).  
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As for the nonlinear specification, we can note that the variable (regl_quality) loses its significance but its 
effect is always positive. The implementation of policies and regulations in a country contributes to not 
only the development of the private sector but also to economic development, and this, by gaining 
confidence and reducing uncertainty among investors and, therefore, encourage them to invest more. 
Finally, specification (4) attests to a negative and significant relationship at the 5% threshold between 
corruption and economic growth. In the nonlinear specification (4) ‘, the coefficient of the variable 
(corrupt) keeps the negative sign but becomes insignificant. We can notice here that even a low level of 
corruption seems to have a negative effect on economic growth. This seems to corroborate the results of 
Mauro (1997) and Collier (2000) who highlighted the fact that corruption slows the rate of growth of the 
country’s production. In addition, Wei (1997) has shown that corruption generally overwhelms 
investment. Finally, Johnson et al. (1998) emphasized the consideration that corruption reduces tax 
revenue, which pushes the country into debt to deal with shortcomings in the state budget.  
Regarding the variable interest public debt, applying a linear specification shows that there is a negative 
and significant relationship between the level of public debt (log_public_debt) and the annual growth 
rate of GDP per capita at constant price. These results corroborate those found in an extensive empirical 
literature (Kumar and Woo (2010), Panizza and Presbitero (2012), etc.). Furthermore, the results 
demonstrate that even by introducing the institutional variables, public debt continues to dampen 
economic growth.  
However, both theoretical and empirical literature on the issue attests that linear specification may be 
inappropriate for properly identifying the impact of a high level of debt on economic growth, since the 
relationship may be non-linear. Testing the hypothesis of non-linearity of public debt amounts to 
introducing the square of the indebtedness indicator in specifications (1) ‘, (2) ‘, (3) ‘and (4) ‘ of the 
model. The transition to the non-linear form did not change the results obtained for the different variables 
used in the linear specification. The results found show that the effect of the variable (log_public_debt) 
on economic growth becomes positive and significant at the 1% and 5% thresholds, while the effect of its 
square (log_pub_debt_carr) is negative and significant. We therefore note the existence of a non-linear 
relationship between public debt and economic growth. Indeed, public debt positively affects economic 
growth up to a certain threshold. Beyond this threshold, its effect becomes negative. This phenomenon is 
because debt within reasonable limits can allow the countries of the region to consolidate their growth. 
However, from a certain level, the debt can exceed the repayment capacity and therefore disadvantage 
growth by the high cost of its service, which, in turn, will discourage investment. 
Finally, according to the results of Sargan/Hansen’s over-identification tests, we accept the hypothesis of 
validity of the instruments. The statistics from this test indicate that the instruments used are also valid. 
Similarly, the results of the autocorrelation tests lead us to accept the hypothesis of absence of 
autocorrelation of the errors of order 1 and 2: 𝐴𝑅 (1) 𝑒𝑡 𝐴𝑅 (2). This was the case for all of the 
specifications. 
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4.3 Robustness Tests 
We test the robustness of the results already obtained by adding other control variables, namely, the 
population growth rate (log_popgrowth) and the unemployment rate (log_unempl_rate). The results for 
this specification are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Results of Estimates 
  
gdp _cap_growth_rate (-1) 
Linear specifications 
 
Non-linear specifications 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (1) ‘  (2) ‘  (3) ‘  (4) ‘  (5) ‘  
-0.588**  
(0.032) 
-0.358***  
(0.051) 
-1.792***  
(0.089)  
-0.406***  
(0.083) 
-0.940  
(0.142)  
-0.666**  
(0.044)  
-0.351*  
(0.009)  
-3.818  
(0.139)  
-0.578***  
(0.066)  
-1.341  
(0.464)  
lag _log_gdp_percapita  -0.075  
(0.665)  
-0.280**  
(0.030) 
0.196  
(0.581)  
-0.270**  
(0.015) 
-0.098  
(0.609)  
-0.154  
(0.468)  
-0.406*  
(0.005)  
0.846  
(0.302)  
-0.310**  
(0.033)  
0.035  
(0.951)  
log _invest  0.072*  
(0.002)  
0.026**  
(0.013) 
0.053*  
(0,000)  
0.034*  
(0.001)  
0.040*  
(0,000)  
-0.006  
(0.945)  
0.027**  
(0.010) 
0.061*  
(0.005)  
0.028**  
(0.043)  
0.031  
(0.261)  
loginflation  -0.006**
*  
(0.077) 
0.005*  
(0,000)  
0.0007  
(0.912)  
0.010*  
(0.001) 
0.008  
(0.172)  
-0.008  
(0.160)  
0.002  
(0.344)  
-0.006  
(0.379)  
0.005**  
(0.020) 
0.001  
(0.824)  
log _openess  0.060**  
(0.049) 
0.045**  
(0.017) 
-0.011  
(0.714)  
0.027  
(0.104)  
0.012  
(0.676)  
0.169  
(0.331)  
0.035**  
(0.036)  
-0.047  
(0.527)  
0.027**  
(0.018) 
0.011  
(0.821)  
log _scola  -0.680  
(0.438)  
0.153*  
(0.008)  
1.031  
(0.147)  
-0.081  
(0.415)  
0.669  
(0.349)  
0.174  
(0.879)  
0.135**  
(0.014)  
2,265  
(0.234)  
0.120  
(0.252)  
1.237  
(0.213)  
log _unempl_rate  -0.023  
(0.420)  
  -0.069**  
(0.045) 
  -0.072
**  
(0.041) 
0.077  
(0.598)  
  -0.046  
(0.162)  
  -0.036  
(0.241)  
log _popgrowth    -0.025**  
(0.043) 
  -0.032*  
(0,000)  
-0.044  
(0.156)  
  -0.030*  
(0.007)  
  -0.034*  
(0,000)  
-0.033  
(0.521)  
log _public_debt  -0.021  
(0.192)  
-0.022**  
(0.023) 
-0.019**  
(0.032) 
-0.015***  
(0.083) 
-0.024
*  
(0.004)  
1,694  
(0.487)  
0.080*  
(0.001)  
0.443  
(0.109)  
0.129*  
(0,000)  
0.208  
(0.228)  
log _pub_debt_carr            -0.241  
(0.479)  
-0.016*  
(0.001)  
-0.068***  
(0.086)  
-0.025*  
(0,000)  
-0.035  
(0.151)  
regl _quality     0.092*** 
(0.056)  
0.026*** 
(0.061)  
0.041 
(0.296) 
    0.146*** 
(0.083) 
0.015 
(0.244) 
0.043 
(0.618 
O bservations 107 137 64 81 64 107 137 64 81 64 
Sargan test 1.076* 0.076* 0.175* 5.333* 1,327* 0.462* 3.930* 0.616* 2.923* 3.81* 
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(1,000) (1,000) (1,000)  (1,000)  (1,000) (1,000) (1,000)  (1,000) (1,000) (1,000) 
AR (1) 1,136 
(0.255) 
-1.021 
(0.307) 
0.422 
(0.672) 
-0.522 
(0.601) 
0.475 
(0.634) 
0.603 
(0.546) 
-0.877 
(0.380) 
-0.821 
(0.411) 
-0.203 
(0.839) 
-0.254 
(0.798) 
AR (2) 0.048 
(0.961) 
0.048 
(0.961) 
-0.442 
(0.658) 
-0.222 
(0.823) 
-0.484 
(0.627) 
0.466 
(0.640) 
0.823 
(0.410) 
0.797 
(0.425)        
-0.545 
(0.585) 
-0.115 
(0.908) 
*, ** and *** significant respectively at 1%, 5% and 10%. The figures in brackets are p-values. 
Source: author’s construction.  
 
The results obtained do not diverge much from those obtained previously. With regard to the investment 
variable (log_invest), it should be underlined that the results are, for the most part, significant and 
consistent with the various theoretical works. Thus, and as theories suggest, the rate of investment has a 
beneficial effect on growth. However, by introducing the unemployment rate variable in the non-linear 
specification (1) ‘, the effect of the investment rate on growth becomes negative and not significant. This 
result can be justified by the reduction in foreign direct investment in the Union linked, on the one hand, 
to the global economic recession, and on the other, to the growing uncertainty stemming from the 
political and security crises transitions in which the countries affected have higher premium risks.  
From the results presented above, we can notice that the addition of the control variables influences the 
significance and the expected signs of the coefficients of the variables of interest. With regard to the 
unemployment rate, the results of the majority of the estimates show a negative but not significant effect 
on economic growth. Similarly, we note that all the coefficients of the variable population growth rate 
(log_popgrowth) are expected signs for all the regressions. Consistent with theoretical growth models, 
we observe that economic growth is negatively influenced by the rate of population growth. 
As for the debt indicator, the results obtained are the same as those obtained in the previous specifications. 
Public debt in its linear form has a negative impact on economic growth. Moreover, the results of the 
quadratic form in Table 2 shows that up to a limit value, the public debt promotes economic growth. 
Exceeding this value, public debt becomes detrimental to growth, which proves the existence of a 
non-linear relationship between these two variables. However, it must be emphasized that the 
coefficients on public debt are not significant, and this, in the presence of the unemployment rate as a 
control variable. This can be explained by the high level of unemployment in the WAEMU area. The 
effect on economic growth of the public debt is absorbed by that of the unemployment rate.  
4.4 Identification of the Threshold Effect  
In the section, it is about determining the optimal level of public debt by the quadratic method. The 
derivation of equation (3) with respect to DPit gives:  
𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝜕DPit = 𝛽1 + 2𝛽2DPit         
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At the point of optimal indebtedness, 𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝜕DPit
= 0. This makes it possible to derive the optimal threshold for 
public debt: 
𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝜕DPit = 0 ⟺ 𝛽1 + 2𝛽2DPit = 0 ⟺ DPit = − 𝛽12𝛽2    
The public debt variable in the basic model is expressed in logarithms, so the determination of the 
optimal debt threshold is done by taking the exponential:  
𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
∗ = exp (− 𝛽1
2𝛽2
). 
 
Table 5. Threshold of Public Debt in% of GDP 
Specification (1)’ from Table 3  Specification (3)’ from Table 3  Specification (4)’from Table 4  
14.037%  15.095%  12.194%  
Source: author’s calculation.  
 
Table 3 shows the point of debt diversion beyond which the effect of public debt becomes negative. We 
note that the debt threshold for the entire sample varies between 12 and 15% of GDP. Indeed, the 
thresholds obtained are appropriate for our case, and this, generally, by the consistency of the results with 
the various works dealing with the link between public debt and growth. The level of public debt of the 
WAEMU countries is relatively lower compared to that of the developed countries, which explains, 
although partially, the thresholds obtained. This seems important to us because of the absence of 
theoretical or empirical work that has explained the public debt-growth relationship in the region as a 
whole.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this article was to investigate the nature of the relationship between public debt and 
economic growth and to decide whether there is a threshold beyond which such a relationship will 
change for countries of WAEMU. 
The econometric results obtained reveal that, overall, public debt has an effect on economic growth. 
However, two kinds of specifications were adopted. Linearly, public debt positively and significantly 
affects economic growth. According to a quadratic specification, public debt has a positive impact to a 
certain threshold beyond which its effect becomes negative. This threshold is around 12% to 15% 
confirming the hypothesis of non-linearity of the debt. Robustness tests consist of introducing new 
control variables, namely, the population growth rate and the unemployment rate. The results are, for the 
most part, significant and consistent with the various theoretical works. 
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In addition, the threshold at which the public debt—growth relationship changes sign is around 15%. 
This threshold is not surprising due to the low debt ratios of several countries of the Union relative to 
developed ones.  
These results have implications for economic policies. Indeed, governments can stimulate economic 
growth by reducing the weight of their debt. In fact, public debt is a question of sustainability before 
being a need for liquidity. Thus, significant levels of public debt raise sustainability problems in terms of 
public finances as well as solvency risks, and this, through the increase in the premium risk, which in turn, 
leads to an increase in the cost of borrowing for countries. In addition, the accumulation of public debts 
generates a sharp increase in interest rates that can harm economic growth through a decline in private 
investment.  
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Note 
Note 1. Eight (08) countries make up the WAEMU, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea 
Bissau, Mali. 
 
 
